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Abstract: We experimentally compare under-revelation of supply and
demand across alternative variations of ascending and descending twosided price clock auctions. We find that buyers reduce demand more
when the price is ascending but sellers’ behavior is consistent across
clock directions. As a result, the clock price rule has empirical effects on
efficiency even though it is theoretically neutral.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2560064

“It is good for nothing,” cries the buyer; but when he has gone his way, then he boasts.
-Proverbs 20:14

Auctions are popular tools for allocating scarce resources in a timely manner. Krishna
(2009) notes that the most widespread auction rules are iteration (participants may revise their
bids) and an ascending price. Cramton (1998) suggests two reasons why these rules might be so
popular. First, iteration provides feedback to the bidders on their private valuation of winning
compared to the valuations of their competitors.
discovery process.

This assists the participants in the price

Second, the ascending price rule confers a sense of legitimacy on the

outcome, because the losing bidders are given multiple opportunities to outbid the winner(s), but
ultimately decline to do so. The strong track record of ascending price auctions has lead
economists to study them in multiple contexts, including the sale of treasury bills (Ausubel and
Cramton, 1998), carbon emission permits (Cramton and Kerr, 1999), electromagnetic spectrum
licenses (Banks et al., 2003), nitrous oxide emission permits (Porter, et al., 2009) and even the
provision of public goods (Levati and Neugebauer, 2004).
The ascending price rule is popular for “one-sided” auctions, in which supply is fixed
exogenously and buyers are the only active participants. However, for “two-sided” auctions – in
which supply is determined endogenously and both buyers and sellers are active – the Double
Auction (DA) institution (Smith 1962) is usually deemed more appropriate, particularly for
environments in which participants wish to buy or sell multiple units. The DA essentially
consists of multiple single-unit auctions in which buyers call out successively higher bids and
sellers successively lower offers until an agreed price is reached. Note that this process, like the
one-sided ascending price auction, also provides feedback to buyers (sellers) and offers losing
participants multiple opportunities to outbid (undersell) the winners.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2560064

A third salutary feature of the DA is that it discourages participants from strategically
reducing the number of units they demand or supply in an effort to manipulate the market price.
If all trades in an auction are executed at a uniform price it is profitable for buyers (sellers) to
reduce their demand for (supply of) some units if doing so sufficiently lowers (raises) the price at
which they buy (sell) the remaining units.1 Consequently, a uniform price auction is likely to be
inefficient. Traders have the option of strategically reducing demand or supply to manipulate
prices in a DA, but to do so profitably would require an overwhelming amount of coordination,
because the price for each unit is determined independently. As a result, DAs routinely exploit
all of the available gains from trade.
The incentive to strategically reduce is strongest when there is some asymmetry in the
participants’ message space and/or their ability to withhold units to affect the price (i.e., market
power). In a posted offer market, for example, sellers set prices and buyers decide how many
units to purchase. Holt (1989) notes that in such markets prices tend to approach the competitive
equilibrium from above or fail to converge to it altogether. Davis and Holt (1994) show that
posted offer prices tend to be higher – and efficiency lower – when supply is configured in such
a way that one seller can profitably raise prices by withholding some of his output.
Markets with symmetrical message space and market power provide a weaker incentive
to strategically reduce, because the price effect of supply reduction may be offset by demand
reduction, and vice versa. Yet even under these conditions traders may attempt to manipulate
prices. Bronfman, et al. (1996) conducted laboratory experiments on a tatonnement auction, in

1

For a theoretical model showing that all uniform price multiple-unit auctions encourage demand reduction, see
Asuebel and Cramton (2002). For evidence of demand reduction in laboratory experiments, see Alsemgeest,
Noussair and Olson (1998), Kagel and Levin (2001) and Porter and Vragov (2006). For evidence of demand
reduction in multiple-unit field experiments, see List and Lucking-Reiley (2000) and Engelbrecht-Wiggans, List and
Reiley (2006).
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which traders reported the quantity of units they were willing to buy and sell in response to
provisional price announcements. They found that traders under-revealed supply and demand by
about a third of their units. McCabe, Rassenti and Smith (1993) studied a uniform price double
auction (UPDA) institution. In the UPDA a provisional uniform price is iteratively reported in
response to buy and sell orders from the traders, and all contracts trade at the uniform price when
some market-closing criterion is met. In at least 49% of their auctions one sixth or more of the
profitable units were withheld.2
But while the DA is generally more efficient than uniform price institutions, it has three
undesirable features. First, the DA generates greater price volatility. A dramatic example is the
2010 “flash crash,” in which the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell by almost 1,000 points only
to recover a few minutes later. The event had spillover effects on futures markets as well,
causing the E-mini S&P 500 prices to fall by over 5% (Easley, Lopez de Prado and O’Hara
2011). Price volatility may undercut the perceived fairness of the trading process, and may even
drive risk averse traders from the market, reducing the available gains from trade (Pagano,
1989).

Moreover, Budish, Cramton and Shim (2013) have shown that stock market price

volatility causes market correlations to break down at sufficiently small time intervals. This
opens arbitrage opportunities for high frequency traders, who compete on response time rather
than price. Budish, Cramton and Shim (2013) argue that this creates an arms race for speed that
is socially wasteful, widens the market spread and diminishes liquidity. To discourage this arms
race they propose replacing the existing DA market design with frequent two-sided call auctions.

2

McCabe, Rassenti and Smith (1994) do not report summary statistics of demand or supply reduction, but we were
able to construct a lower bound of based on the reported of efficiencies in their Appendix B.
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Second, the discriminatory pricing structure of a DA also forces participants to reveal
some information on their maximum willingness-to-pay (WTP) and willingness-to-accept
(WTA). The buyer who pays the highest price in a DA has revealed information about himself
that may be costly in later negotiations. Ditto the seller who accepted the lowest price. A
uniform pricing rule, in contrast, eliminates intra-auction price volatility and minimizes the
information on WTP and WTA that the winners must disclose.
Finally, DAs are not well suited to complex environments. For example, the FCC plans
an incentive auction in 2015 to transfer a large portion of the radio frequency spectrum from
broadcast television to mobile broadband. Television stations relinquishing their spectrum rights
may do so in a number of different ways, including channel sharing with another station, moving
from their current frequency to a VHF frequency, or going off the air altogether. Consequently,
a broadcaster’s chosen course of action will depend on the tradeoffs it poses and the prices
offered for each. Moreover, the geographic size of broadcast licenses may encompass multiple
broadband licenses, so that single-unit transactions are not always possible. These features
(among others) make the DA an inappropriate format for the incentive auction. Instead, the FCC
plans to implement a design proposed by Milgrom et al. (2012) using sequential but
interdependent auctions with price clocks. First, a set of descending price clock auctions (one
for each method of relinquishing licenses) will determine the supply of spectrum for a
geographic region. Then, an ascending price auction will allocate the spectrum among buyers.
In principle, these clocks can run simultaneously as we test here.
Given the interest in multiple-unit two-sided uniform price auctions – particularly
auctions using a price clock – it is relevant to study these institutions in light of earlier work by
McCabe, Rassenti and Smith (1992) – hereafter MRS. They conducted experiments using clock
4

auction formats, but none of their mechanisms used an ascending price as the sole method for
price discovery. They did, however, test a descending price auction in which experienced traders
obtained an average of 94% of the available surplus. It was dubbed Dutch-English (DE) because
the auction presented improving terms of trade (Dutch) to buyers and worsening terms of trade
(English) to sellers as it progressed. The auction used a “price clock” which displayed an initial
provisional price that was set high and then reduced by predetermined decrements. As the
provisional price fell buyers could commit to buying additional units at or below the provisional
price, while sellers could reduce the number of units they were willing to offer at or below the
provisional price. The auction closed at the final price when the total commitments to buy
equaled those to sell.
One of the striking features of the DE format is its performance in comparison to the two
alternative two-sided uniform price institutions that MRS tested: the Double English (EE) and
Double Dutch (DD) auctions. These institutions used one price clock for buyers and a second
for sellers. In the EE the price on the buyers’ clock started low and ticked up at predetermined
intervals. The price on the sellers’ clock started high and ticked down using the same intervals.
At the initial prices buyers and sellers indicated how many units they were willing to buy and
sell at the prices on their respective clocks. Only one clock was active at a time. The price on
the buyers’ clock increased until buyers had reduced their demand sufficiently to result in excess
supply.

At this point the price on the sellers’ clock fell until sellers had reduced their

commitments to sell sufficiently to result in excess demand. The auction concluded when both
clocks displayed the same price.
MRS’s DD auction was precisely the reverse of the EE. The price on the buyers’ clock
started high and ticked down over time, while the price on the sellers’ clock started low and
5

ticked up. As the buyers’ price fell they increased their demand for units until there was excess
demand. The sellers’ price would then rise until they had increased their commitments to sell
enough units to result in excess supply. Like the EE, the auction concluded when both clocks
displayed the same price.
The distinguishing feature of the EE is that it provides worsening terms of trade to both
sides of the auction. MRS’s traders engaged in significant demand and supply reduction in an
effort to stop their own price clock and extract price concessions from the other side of the
market. In contrast, the DD provides improving terms of trade to both sides of the auction. In
response, traders did not withhold as much of their demand or supply. These differences in
behavior resulted in more trades (and higher efficiency) in the DD than the EE. Across the last
five auctions of their sessions the average efficiency was less than 80% in the EE, but almost
100% in the DD.
We have already noted that the DE achieved 94% efficiency. This is remarkable, because
the DE presents improving terms of trade only to buyers, yet it was almost as efficient as the DD,
which presents improving terms to both sides. The high efficiency of the DE relative to the EE
suggests that buyers are more responsive to the direction of the clock price than are sellers. If
this is true, then an English-Dutch (ED) auction would not perform as well as the DE. An ED
auction would use an initially low provisional price that increases over time, and allow buyers
and sellers to respond by decreasing demand and increasing supply respectively. However, MRS
did not conduct an ED auction, so we cannot know for certain if there is an asymmetry in the
behavior of buyers and sellers.

This omission is significant in light of the prevalence of

ascending price auctions in both the laboratory and the field.
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In this study we report the results of a set of laboratory experiments that explicitly test the
impact of clock direction on under-revelation among buyers and sellers. Our experiments were
designed to answer the following three research questions:
Q1: Do worsening terms of trade encourage a greater increase in under-revelation
among buyers than among sellers?
Q2: If buyers are more responsive than sellers to worsening terms of trade, does the
clock direction affect an auction’s efficiency?
Q3: If buyers are more responsive than sellers to worsening terms of trade, does the
clock direction affect an auction’s uniform price?
The results of our experiments indicate that we can answer the first two research question
in the affirmative. Buyers reduced demand more when they faced an ascending price, but sellers
reduced supply by the same amount whether the price clock was ascending or descending. As a
result the ascending clock led to more under-revelation, which in turn rendered it less efficient
than the descending clock. For research question Q3 we find the answer to be a qualified yes.
On average, prices were lower in the ascending auction, but for the experiments we conducted by
hand this can be explained by differences in the Nash Equilibrium price across clock directions.
For the experiments we conducted on computer terminals, however, the difference in prices was
greater than the game theoretic prediction for most auctions.
1. Experimental Design
1.1. Trading Environment
As a testbed for comparing ascending and descending price clocks, we adopt MRS’s
schedule of induced costs and values. This is shown in Figure 1 along with the trader role
associated with each step of the supply and demand curves. This environment is well suited to
the study of supply and demand reduction for three reasons. First, the supply and demand curves
7

are symmetrical about the competitive equilibrium. Consequently, the optimal strategies of
buyers and sellers are symmetrical when facing improving or worsening terms of trade. For
instance, trader B1 in an ascending clock auction faces precisely the same problem as trader S1
in a descending clock auction. Second, the environment contains a mix of “large traders” and
“small traders.” The former were those who could buy or sell six units in an auction, the latter
could buy or sell three units. Large traders had an advantage in attempting to manipulate the
price in that they could reduce demand or supply by a greater number of units. Finally, for a
given price direction there is a family of Nash Equilibria that is consistent with the competitive
equilibrium and there are no Nash Equilibria that are inconsistent with the competitive
equilibrium. This provides a straightforward baseline against which to compare buyer and seller
behavior.
[Figure 1]
For the following analysis it is important to note that prices in our experiments were
always multiples of five cents. Let M equal the price, in cents, consistent with the mid-point of
the competitive equilibrium price tunnel. If the price is ascending, then the Nash Equilibrium
price is M - 5 and no trader under-reveals supply or demand. To see that this is an equilibrium
note that if all other traders truthfully reveal their costs and values, the marginal seller S4 can
stop the price clock at M - 5 with his final unit to earn a profit of five on each of his three units.
(This need not be done by the marginal seller, sellers S1, S2 or S3 could also stop the clock at
that price if all other sellers revealed their costs truthfully.) In response to this any buyer could
reduce their demand by one unit to force the clock to stop early at M - 10. But this reduction is
not profitable for any buyer.

8

Table 1 displays the profit that each buyer would earn from buying all of his units at a
price of M or M - 5 or dropping one unit to achieve a price of M - 10. (Buyer B5 is excluded
from the table because he would earn zero profit at any of these prices.) Notice that all
inframarginal buyers earn a greater profit by purchasing all of their units at M - 5 than by
purchasing one fewer unit at M - 10. However, notice that if seller S4 attempted to stop the price
at M there are three buyers (B1, B3 and B4) who would be willing to reduce demand by one unit
to stop it at M - 10. Moreover, as we show in Appendix A, there is no coalition of buyers who
could profitably reduce demand to hold the price below M - 10, nor is there a coalition of sellers
who could profitably withhold supply to push the price above M - 5. Thus, all Nash Equilibria
with an ascending clock are characterized by a price of M - 5 and no strategic reduction. By
symmetry, all Nash Equilibria with a descending clock are characterized by a price of M + 5 and
no strategic reduction.
However, the traders in our experiments knew only their own values or costs.
Consequently, they could not calculate any Nash Equilibria ex ante and we have no reason to
believe that they would refrain from attempting to influence the price through under-revelation.
[Table 1]
Replicating MRS, we added (or subtracted) a random constant from the interval [$1.00,
$4.90] to all values and costs each period to maintain uncertainty about the market clearing
prices. Figure 2 shows the midpoint of the competitive equilibrium (CE) price tunnel in each
period, which ranged from $2.50 to $6.00. In addition, we rotated buyers and sellers along their
respective demand and supply curves. Across 15 iterations (or periods) in each session, a trader
participated at each of the five respective buyer or seller roles three times.
[Figure 2]
9

1.2. Institutions
Our design (displayed in Table 2) consisted of two treatment variables. The first was
whether the price ascended (ED) over the course of the auction or descended (DE). The ED
treatment presented buyers with worsening terms of trade and sellers with improving terms of
trade, while the DE treatment reversed these terms for both sides of the market. We can address
research question Q1 by comparing under-revelation across price clock treatments to determine
whether the terms of trade affected buyer behavior more than seller behavior. By comparing
efficiency and average prices across these treatments we can also answer research questions Q2
and Q3. Notice, however, that the Nash Equilibrium prices are different for the ED and DE
treatments (M - 5 and M + 5 respectively), so that for Q3 we are interested in whether the clock
direction results in price differences that are greater than the game theoretic prediction.
The second treatment variable was whether the auction format was hand-run (Hand),
facilitated by a human auctioneer, or computerized (Comp), facilitated by a price clock. MRS
ran their auctions by hand, and our hand-run treatment was an attempt to find an asymmetry
between buyers and sellers using their protocols.

We then conducted the computerized

experiments as a robustness check.3 The interaction of our two treatment variables gives us four
treatments: ED_Hand, DE_Hand, ED_Comp and DE_Comp.

We describe the pricing

institutions first.
[Table 2]

3

The hand-run experiments were conducted at an East Coast university, while the computerized experiments were
conducted at a university on the West Coast. Consequently, the computerized sessions simultaneously test for
robustness to the auction implementation and the subject pool.
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Characteristic of clock auctions, the prices were announced and traders adjusted
quantities in response. In the ED sessions, the starting price was set to zero in each period and
increased in response to excess demand. By default, at the starting price buyers automatically
demanded all of the units on their demand schedules, totaling 24 units, while sellers supplied
zero units. Thus, the initial excess demand was always 24.
As the price ascended, buyers could reduce their demand in single unit decrements and
sellers could increase their supply in single unit increments, though they were allowed to make
multiple reductions/additions at the same price. In either case, excess demand fell by one unit
each time a trader initiated an alteration. Initially the price rose by 10-cent increments; when
excess demand fell to 10 units or less the price increment was reduced to five cents. When the
excess demand converged to zero the auction was closed. All of the units that were still
demanded by buyers were satisfied by the units that had been supplied by sellers and all
transactions occurred at the final, market-clearing price.
In the sessions with a DE pricing rule, both sides of the market were presented with a
single descending price. We consistently started the price at $7.00, above all traders’ values and
costs. At the starting price buyers were (by default) unwilling to purchase any units and sellers
offered every unit on their supply schedules, creating an excess supply of 24 units. In response
to decreasing price announcements, sellers could reduce supply and buyers could increase
demand, both of which reduced the excess supply by single-unit decrements.

The price

continued to fall by 10-cent decrements with excess supply greater than 10 and by five-cent
decrements thereafter until a price was reached at which quantity supplied equaled quantity
demanded. All transactions occurred simultaneously at this price.
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Now we turn to the auction format. In the hand-run experiments a human auctioneer
coordinated the auctions. The auctioneer called out prices verbally and traders indicated a desire
to alter their quantities supplied or demanded by raising an ID card. To recognize an alteration,
the auctioneer called out the trader’s ID number (in first-come, first-served order), then
announced the new excess supply or demand, and finally repeated the price to allow for
additional alterations by the same trader or others at that price. When no more traders raised
their ID cards, the auctioneer announced a higher price, using the price increments or decrements
described above.
In the computerized experiments the role of the auctioneer was supplied by an interactive
software interface. An automated price clock on their screens showed traders the current price.
The price clock incremented or decremented the price every two seconds so long as there was
excess demand or supply. A button on traders’ screens allowed them to alter the number of units
supplied or demanded. Each click of the button altered a trader’s supply or demand by one unit.
Each time the button was clicked, the price clock paused on its current price for an additional
second. This allowed traders to alter the number of units supplied or demanded by multiple units
at the same price.
The exact excess demand or supply was prominently displayed on the screen with a colored
background. At the start of each period the background was green, indicating that excess
demand or supply was greater than 10 units and the price would adjust in 10-cent increments or
decrements. When the displayed excess demand or supply fell to 10 units the background color
changed to yellow, indicating that the price would adjust in five-cent increments or decrements.
When supply equaled demand the background color changed to red to indicate that the auction
had concluded.
12

1.3. Procedures
We randomly recruited subjects from a pool of undergraduate students who had agreed to
receive invitations to economic experiments on campus.4 Before each session, we took the
subjects through a hypothetical example of how the auction would proceed.5 They were allowed
to ask questions throughout the instructions, after which they participated in a practice round to
become familiar with the trading rules.

In the hand-run treatments the same auctioneer

announced prices and managed traders in all sessions and periods in order to maintain uniformity
across pricing rules within the hand-run treatment cells.
In addition to a $7 participation bonus, traders in the hand-run sessions earned $20.00 on
average. In the computerized sessions the average trader earned $19.96 in addition to the
participation bonus. Including time for instructions, the hand-run sessions typically lasted 45 –
60 minutes, while the computerized sessions lasted 25 – 35 minutes.
140 students participated as traders, with ten traders in each experimental session. We
conducted three sessions of the ED_Hand and DE_Hand treatments, yielding 90 auctions for
analysis. In addition, we conducted four sessions of the ED_Comp and DE_Comp treatments,
giving us 120 auctions.
2. Results
Summary statistics are provided in Table 3 by treatment of the prevalence of underrevelation, efficiency and price deviation from the midpoint of the CE price tunnel, and trader
earnings as a percentage of the Nash Equilibrium baseline. There was considerable evolution in

4

This method of recruitment was used at both universities.

5

The instructions and example we used are available in Appendix B.

13

trader behavior over time, so for each category we provide the average in the first five and final
five auctions.
[Table 3]
2.1. Under-Revelation
We measure under-revelation as the percentage of units not demanded (or supplied) at
market clearing prices below value (or above cost).

This measure is consistent for buyers or

sellers irrespective of clock direction. Specifically, the under-revelation by trader i in period
t ,  it , can be expressed as:

 it 

Qit  qit
Qit

Where Qit is the total number of units on the demand (supply) schedule of trader i valued more
(costing less) than the market clearing price in period t and qit is the number of trades
transacted by trader i in period t .
Under-revelation was widespread although it was not an individually profitable strategy
and became less common with experience (see Figures 3 and 4). Across all of our experiments
there were 1680 instances in which traders who were not extra-marginal could under-reveal to
manipulate the uniform price. They did so in 919 cases, a frequency of 54.7%. For each case of
under-revelation, we calculated the trader’s profit and compared it to the profit he would have
earned if he had acted as a price taker at the Nash Equilibrium price. An overwhelming majority
of the under-revelation was unprofitable, with earnings lower than the price-taking baseline in
820 cases (89.2%). The profitability of under-revelation did not vary systematically by role or
treatment cell.
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Figures 3a and 3b display the average delta among buyers in the hand-run and
computerized sessions respectively. The buyers show a distinct sensitivity to clock direction. In
the hand-run treatments, demand reduction was higher, on average, with an ED rule than a DE
rule in 13 of 15 periods. In the computerized treatments average demand reduction was higher
with an ED clock in 14 periods, though it did show convergence in periods 12 through 15. This
was primarily due to an increase in demand reduction under the DE clock in those periods.
[Figure 3]
Sellers reduced supply at very similar rates under both an ascending and descending
clock (see Figures 3c and 3d). In the hand-run experiments average supply reduction was
substantially higher under a DE price rule for the first two periods, but appears to have
converged by period three or four. In the computerized experiments average supply reduction
was indistinguishable throughout the sessions.
To formally test for the influence of the clock direction, we use the following random-effects
regression model:
y it     1 ED   2 f t    i   it

(1)

In regression (1), y it is the dependent variable of interest in period t of session i 6 and ED is a
dummy variable indicating whether an ED clock was used. The term f t  is a regressionspecific time trend variable taking on one of three functional forms. For datasets in which the
y it asymptotically converge to a value from above or below, we specify f t   1 / t and

6

In the case of under-revelation i indexes the subject rather than the session.
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f t   logt  respectively. For datasets in which the y it show a linear relationship with t , we

specify f t   t . The  i are random effects assumed to be ~ N (0,  2 ) and we correct the error
term for an AR(1) process. We organize our findings around our dependent variables measuring
under-revelation, efficiency, and deviations in price from the competitive equilibrium. For each
of these variables we fit the regression model to the data from the hand-run and computerized
experiments separately.
Table 4 displays the estimates from separately fitting under-revelation among buyers and
sellers to regression model (1). The estimates for the hand-run data indicate that demand
reduction under the ED and DE rules diverged over time, whereas supply reduction converged
rather quickly under these pricing rules. The hand-run buyer regression estimates that buyers
under-revealed an additional 16.1% in ED_Hand relative to DE_Hand (p = 0.027).

This

corresponds roughly to large buyers reducing demand by one additional unit, or small buyers
reducing 0.5 additional units on average. This is moderated in the early periods by the estimated
time trend for the ED_Hand treatment. Notice that the coefficient of ED * 1/t is -0.339 (p =
0.002). For t < 2, this overwhelms the estimated coefficient of ED. As t increases, however, the
marginal effect of the time trend diminishes, so that by period 3 buyers under-reveal more under
an ascending clock than a descending clock.
For sellers in the hand-run experiments the model finds no significant main effect of the
pricing rule. However, the coefficients for 1/t and ED * 1/t are 0.554 (p < 0.001) and -0.487 (p <
0.001) respectively. Thus, supply reduction was higher under the DE rule in early periods, but
converged as the sessions progressed. We conducted period-wise Wald tests to determine how
many periods supply reduction was statistically significantly higher in DE_Hand than in
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ED_Hand. The tests revealed statistically significant differences in only the first four periods (p
< 0.05).
The regression estimates using data from the computerized experiments also show that
buyers responded asymmetrically to the clock direction (though this faded over time) while
sellers did not. In the buyer regression, the estimated coefficient of ED is 0.311 (p < 0.001),
equivalent to nearly two (one) additional unit(s) reduced by large (small) buyers under an ED
clock. The estimated time trend for the ED sessions is negative and significant (p = 0.027),
however, and indicates that demand reduction fell by 1.7 percentage points each period. Periodwise Wald tests indicate that the difference in under-revelation was statistically significant for
the first eleven periods (p < 0.05) and insignificant thereafter (p > 0.1). In the seller regression
the estimates for ED and ED * t are both small and statistically insignificant. We may therefore
conclude that sellers in the computerized session were unresponsive to the direction of the clock.
[Table 4]
Our results indicate that we may answer research question Q1 in the affirmative:
worsening terms of trade encouraged a greater increase in under-revelation among buyers than
among sellers. To our knowledge, these are the first experiments to show a link between clock
direction and under-revelation, and an explanation for these results is not readily available in the
extant auction literature. The tendency of buyers in multi-unit English auctions to reduce
demand has been known for quite some time. Alsemgeest, Nousair and Olson (1998), Kagel and
Levin (2001) and Porter and Vragov (2006) all found that English auctions for multiple units
encouraged under-revelation and generated lower revenue relative to uniform price sealed bid
auctions. Kagel and Levin (2001) showed (and Porter and Vragov, 2006 speculate) that this was
due to the fact that bidders in the English auctions had information about one another’s
17

withdrawals, which facilitated collusion. However, this does not explain our findings because
traders in our experiments received information on changes in excess supply or demand in both
the ED and DE treatments, yet it was primarily the buyers whose under-revelation changed.
The experimental investigation with results most similar to our own was performed by
Brown, Plott and Sullivan (2008). They conducted laboratory auctions in which eight buyers bid
for eight items in simultaneous auctions. Valuations were assigned so that each buyer had the
highest value for one item, the second highest value for another item, and so on. This provided
an opportunity for collusive under-revelation, in which each buyer bid only on his own most
highly valued item, winning it at the lowest possible price. In one treatment they sold the items
with simultaneous open outcry English auctions (i.e., prices ascended but were not controlled by
a price clock). In a second they used simultaneous Dutch clock auctions. Brown, Plott and
Sullivan (2008) report that buyers practiced the collusive strategy in the English auctions, but bid
competitively in the Dutch auctions. However, they show that collusion was a Nash Equilibrium
in the English auctions, but not the Dutch auctions, due to the inability to punish defection in the
latter. In our experiments the Nash Equilibria were symmetrical across price institutions.
Finally, McCabe, Rassenti and Smith (1990) conducted one-sided multiple-unit English
and Dutch auctions. They found that prices were slightly lower than the theoretical prediction in
the English auctions and higher than the theoretical prediction in the Dutch. However, although
their auctions allocated multiple units, each bidder could win only one unit. Thus, underrevelation was not an equilibrium strategy in their experiments. The high prices in their Dutch
auctions may therefore be due to risk averse bidders. The low prices in their English auctions
may have been caused by bidders with relatively low values dropping out of the auction early.
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Our own experiments were designed to determine the existence of an asymmetry between
buyers and sellers, rather than to uncover the source of the asymmetry. However, we offer one
hypothesis that we consider plausible, if speculative. Notice that under-revealing more in the
face of worsening terms of trade is consistent with loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979,
Tversky and Kahneman 1991). It is well known that agents are often more eager to avoid losses
than they are to avoid gains. In the ED treatments the buyers saw their potential profits falling
over the course of the auction, whereas in the DE treatments they saw their potential profits
increasing. Loss aversion may have motivated them to under-reveal more to stop the ED clock
than to prolong the progress of the DE clock. If this was the case, then the fact that the sellers
responded substantially less to the clock direction suggests that they had little or no loss
aversion. That is, an agent’s degree of loss aversion may be susceptible to framing effects, such
as whether they are a buyer or seller. We believe this explanation should be the subject of future
experimental inquiry.
2.2. Efficiency
Research question Q2 asks whether the clock direction affects an auction’s efficiency.
We have noted the close link between strategic reductionunder-revelation and efficiency. As a
result of this link we would expect the clock direction to influence the observed efficiencies as
well. If buyers reduce demand more under an ED clock but sellers are unresponsive to the clock
direction then we would expect more under-revelation in the ED treatments relative to the DE
treatments, and therefore lower efficiency. Moreover, since demand reduction diverged in the
hand-run experiments and converged in the computerized experiments, we would expect similar
patterns of divergence and convergence in the efficiency data, though the durations may be
different. This is because the relationship between under-revelation and efficiency is a noisy
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one.

Demand reduction among buyers with higher values will impact efficiency more

substantially than reduction among those with lower values.
[Figure 4]
Figure 4 displays average efficiencies by period. In the hand-run experiments average
efficiency shows a quick convergence after the first two periods, in which it was actually higher
under the ED clock. This convergence ended in period nine, where there is a visible separation
in which the DE_Hand dominates the ED_Hand. In the computerized experiments efficiency
appears to be higher under a DE clock for the first six periods and virtually identical thereafter.
[Table 5]
Our regression models support these findings (see Table 5). The model for the hand-run
data estimates that efficiency was 45.5% in the first period of DE_Hand (p < 0.001), while it was
18.1 percentage points higher in the same period of ED_Hand (p = 0.008). However, the
estimated coefficient for ED * log(t) is negative and significant (p = 0.001), indicating that
efficiency grew faster under a DE clock. The model estimates that by the 10th period of
DE_Hand efficiency had increased by 42.7 percentage points (p < 0.001) to 87.7%. In the same
period of ED_Hand it had increased by only 16.9 percentage points to 80.5%. Using period-wise
Wald tests, we find that efficiency was significantly higher (p < 0.05) in DE_Hand for the last
seven periods.
In the computerized sessions our model estimates that efficiency was initially 15.1
percentage points lower in ED_Comp than in DE_Comp (p = 0.017), but this difference
disappeared over time. The estimated coefficient for ED * t is positive and significant (p =
0.027), and indicates that efficiency grew 1.1 percentage points faster per period with an ED
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clock. Period-wise Wald tests find that efficiency was significantly higher in DE_Hand (p <
0.05) for the first five periods and marginally significantly higher in period six (p = 0.069).
Finally, it is worth noting that the computerized auctions were noticeably less efficient
than the hand-run ones, even though they started at a higher average level of efficiency. In the
final five periods of the hand-run sessions the average efficiencies were 80.5% for the ED clock
and 89.4% for the DE. In the computerized sessions these averages were 73.8% for ED and
76.4% for DE. Using the average efficiency per session as our unit of observation we conducted
three Mann-Whitney tests, one for each clock direction and a third pooling all observations. The
first two tests indicate that efficiency is significantly higher in the hand-run experiments at the
5% level regardless of the clock direction (p = 0.034 in both cases). The pooled test finds
efficiency to be higher in the hand-run experiments at the 1% significance level (p = 0.003).
The hand-run and computerized experiments were conducted at separate locations, so it is
possible that the differences in efficiency reflect differences across subject pools. It may also be
that the hand-run format was more conducive to learning, so that traders in that format discarded
fewer high value and low cost units. Yet another possibility is that the difference is inherent in
the details of the formats themselves.
Under both auction formats a majority of traders’ activity tended to happen in the last few
seconds of the auction. It was not uncommon, for instance, for excess supply or demand to fall
from ten or more units to zero units in the final tick of the clock. In the hand-run experiments
traders were allowed to alter their trading commitments multiple times at the same price, but this
required raising their ID cards multiple times. The auctioneer attempted to recognize IDs in first
come, first served order, and in many cases multiple ID cards were raised at roughly the same
time at the final price. Consequently, the auctioneer prioritized alterations at the final price by
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cycling through traders. In the computerized experiments traders did not have to wait to be
recognized and alterations were prioritized by which traders clicked their buttons the fastest.
Under this prioritization scheme, one buyer (seller) could reduce all of his units at a given price
before any sellers had managed to supply (demand) them.

One consequence of this could be

that alterations were more evenly spread out between buyers and sellers in the hand-run
experiments. A second consequence could be that, in the race to reduce units at the end of an
auction, traders in the electronic experiments clicked the buttons on their screens more times
than they intended. In either case the result would be lower levels of reduction in the hand-run
experiments.
We tested whether reduction was lower in the hand-run experiments by conducting a
Mann-Whitney test with average under-revelation by session as the unit of observation. Overall,
participants under-revealed by 20.5% in the hand-run sessions and 31% in the computerized
sessions. The two samples are significantly different at the 5% level (p = 0.014). To test
whether the electronic interface encouraged accidental reductions we measured the frequency
with which traders reduced all of their units. (We excluded auctions in which the trader was
extra marginal and reduction of all units was the Nash Equilibrium strategy.) Reducing all units
strongly suggests an error on the trader’s part because it guarantees that his earnings for the
auction will be zero. The average trader reduced all of his units in 6% of auctions in the handrun experiments and 10% of units in the electronic auctions. A Mann-Whitney test confirms that
the distributions are statistically different across auction formats (p = 0.043).
A final piece of evidence that the auction format influenced efficiency through underrevelation is the variance of traders’ reduction across rounds. For each participant we measured
the variance in the percent of units he reduced across all auctions in which he was not an extra
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marginal trader.

In the electronic experiments, where the number of units reduced was

dependent on whether one was among the first to start reducing, the average variance was 9
percentage points. In the hand-run experiments, where the auctioneer cycled through traders
who tried to reduce simultaneously, the average variance was 6 percentage points.

The

distributions are statistically different according to a Mann-Whitney test (p < 0.001).
These results strongly suggest that efficiency was degraded by chaotic trader behavior in
the last few seconds of an auction, and that a human auctioneer kept the chaos in check to some
extent. In many applications in the field a human auctioneer would be impractical, yet it may
still be possible to enhance a uniform-price auction’s efficiency through simple rules that
promote a more orderly processing of traders’ decisions. For example, rather than processing
each decision sequentially, the auction software may process them in batches, with all orders
submitted at the same price increment processed simultaneously. Under such a simultaneous
processing rule, the software could cycle through each trader in much the same way as our
human auctioneer did, executing one order from a given trader at a time until all orders were
processed or there was no excess supply or demand. Alternatively, the software could explicitly
favor higher trade volume by first executing all orders in the batch that increase the traders’
commitments, and then executing the orders that reduce them if there was still excess supply or
demand. This processing rule may be appropriate as a counterbalance to traders’ tendency to
under-reveal.
2.3. Price
Finally, we turn to whether the clock direction affects an auction’s uniform price
(research question Q3). Because the Nash Equilibrium prices are slightly higher for the DE (M +
5) than the ED (M - 5) we are particularly interested in whether under-revelation generates a
23

larger difference in prices than the game theoretic prediction. Figure 5 displays the average
deviation from the midpoint of the CE tunnel by period. In both auction formats the clock
direction influenced prices, although they were rarely exactly equal to the Nash Equilibrium in
any treatment. In the ED sessions the final price was equal to M - 5 in 24.4% of the hand-run
auctions and 20% of the computerized auctions. With a DE clock the final price equaled M + 5
in 20% of the hand-run auctions and 18.3% of the computerized auctions.
[Figure 5]
However, prices in the majority of auctions were within the CE price tunnel. In 55% of
the computerized auctions (66 of 120) the final price was within 10 cents of the CE midpoint.
The prices were even more consistent with the CE in the hand-run experiments: 86.7% of the
hand-run auctions (78 of 90) generated CE prices. In the computerized experiments the two
clock directions resulted in prices that were extremely disparate in the early periods but
converged over the duration of the sessions. In the hand-run experiments the price differences
were generally consistent with the Nash Equilibrium.
[Table 6]
We use the deviation from the CE mid-point as a dependent variable in regression model
(1) for both auction formats (see Table 6).7 If prices did not systematically deviate from the
Nash Equilibrium predictions then we would expect the estimated constant to be 5 and the sum
of the constant and estimated coefficient of ED to equal -5. For the hand-run experiments the
estimated constant term is 2.34, and this is not significantly different from 5 (Wald Test, p =
0.376). The estimated coefficient of ED is -8.27 (p = 0.052), and its sum with the estimated

7

Recall from Figure 1 that the price tunnel spans 20 cents, so taken from the midpoint of the tunnel a price in the
interval [-10, 10] is consistent with the competitive equilibrium.
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constant is -5.93. A Wald test cannot reject the null hypothesis that this sum is equal to -5 (p =
0.757). Thus, we can conclude that prices in the hand-run experiments were consistent with the
Nash Equilibrium on average. This was persistent across the duration of the experiments, as the
time trend variables are not significant in the hand-run model.
The model estimates using data from the electronic experiments confirm that in those
sessions the clock direction’s influence was profound in the initial auctions but waned over time.
The estimated constant term indicates that prices in the DE_Comp were almost 19 cents above
the CE midpoint in the first auction (p = 0.002). Prices for the same auction were more than 36
cents below the midpoint in the ED_Comp, as the coefficient for ED is -55.30 (p < 0.001).
However, the time trend coefficients show strong convergence over time. Log(t) is negative and
marginally significant (p = 0.062), while ED * Log(t) is positive and highly significant (p <
0.001).

Because the time trend variables are designated in logs of base 10, the most

straightforward interpretation of their coefficients is the change in prices as of the tenth auction.
Using this interpretation, prices in the DE_Comp had fallen by more than 12 cents and prices in
the ED_Comp had risen by almost 45 cents. Using period-wise Wald tests, we find that prices in
the DE_Comp were significantly greater than 5 in the first 4 auctions (p < 0.043) and not
significantly different than 5 thereafter (p > 0.092). A similar analysis indicates that prices in the
ED_Comp were statistically significantly less than -5 in the first 12 auctions (p < 0.025) and
were consistent with the Nash Equilibrium in only the final 3 auctions (p > 0.075).
3. Concluding Remarks
MRS’s early work in multi-unit clock auctions suggested that buyers (but not sellers)
under-reveal more when they face worsening terms of trade than when they face improving
terms of trade. We explicitly test for this asymmetry in both a hand-run and computerized
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environment. Our experiments reveal that the asymmetry is real, although its pattern is not
consistent. In our hand-run auctions buyer and seller behavior diverges over time, so that it takes
a few periods for the asymmetry to emerge. In our computerized auctions the asymmetry is
apparent (and large) from the very first auction, but diminishes with experience.
As a result of the observed behavioral asymmetry, prices and efficiency are generally
higher when the auction uses a descending price rule. For two-sided call auctions this implies
that the DE institution is preferable from a social perspective, though it will likely be more
popular among sellers than buyers. An interesting question for future research is whether
buyers’ response to the direction of the price clock carries over to one-sided auctions as well as
two-sided auctions. If so, then sellers in multi-unit auctions in the field may be able to enhance
their revenues and improve social welfare simply by implementing a descending price rule.
In addition to the asymmetry in buyer behavior, our experiments indicate that the rules by
which traders’ orders are processed can have a substantial impact on allocative efficiency. Gains
from trade were 6.7 to 13 percentage points higher with a human auctioneer than with a
computerized auction format. This seems to be due to the fact that the computerized format
enabled a more chaotic entry of orders near the close of the auction, which promoted trader error
and increased the amount of under-revelation. This shortcoming in the computerized auctions
might be overcome by executing the traders’ orders in batches and giving priority to orders that
will create trades.

This type of processing rule may be especially appropriate in a field

application such as the FCC’s incentive auctions, where one of the primary aims is to maximize
the amount of spectrum released by the incumbent license holders.

26

References
Alsemgeest, P., Noussair, C., and Olson, M. (1998). Experimental comparisons of auctions
under single- and multi-unit demand. Economic Inquiry, 36(1), pp. 87-97.
Ausubel, L. M., and Cramton, P. (1998). Auctioning Securities. Working paper.
Ausubel, L. M., and Cramton, P. (2002). Demand reduction and inefficiency in multi-unit
auctions. Working paper.
Banks, J., Olson, M., Porter, D., Rassenti, S., and Smith, V. (2003). Theory, experiment and the
federal communications commission spectrum auctions. Journal of Economic Behavior
and Organization, vol. 51(3), pp. 303 – 350.
Bronfman, Corinne, Kevin McCabe, David Porter, Stephen Rassenti and Vernon Smith. (1996).
An experimental examination of the Walrasian tatonnement mechanism. RAND Journal
of Economics, vol. 27(4), pp. 681-699.
Brown, Alexander, Charles R. Plott and Heidi J. Sullivan. (2008). Collusion facilitating and
collusion breaking power of simultaneous ascending and descending price auctions.
Economic Inquiry, Vol. 47(3), pp. 395-424.
Budish, Eric B., Peter Cramton and John J. Shim. (2013). The high-frequency trading arms race:
frequent batch auctions as a market design response. Chicago Booth Research Paper No.
14-03.
Cramton, P. (1998). Ascending Auctions. European Economic Review, vol. 42(3-5), pp. 745 –
756.
Cramton, P., and Kerr, S. (1999). The Distributional Effects of Carbon Regulation in Thomas
Sterner (ed.) The Market and the Environment, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, chp. 12.
Davis, Douglas D. and Charles A. Holt. (1994). Market power and mergers in laboratory markets
with posted prices. RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 25(3), 467-487.
Easley, David, Marcos Lopez de Prado and Maureen O’Hara. (2011). The microstructure of the
“flash crash”: flow toxicity, liquidity crashes and the probability of informed trading.
The Journal of Portfolio Management, 37(2), 118-128.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., List, J. A., and Reiley, D. H. (2006). Demand reduction in multiunit auctions with varying numbers of bidders: theory and evidence from a field
experiment. International Economic Review, 47(1), 203-231.
Holt, Charles A. (1989). The exercise of market power in laboratory experiments. Journal of
Law and Economics, vol. 32(2), S107 – S130.

27

Kagel, J. H., and Levin, D. (2001). Behavior in multi-unit demand auctions: experiments with
uniform price and dynamic Vickrey auctions. Econometrica, vol. 69(2), pp. 413-454.
Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory of decisions under risk. Econometrica,
vol. 47(2), pp. 263–291.
Krishna, V. (2009). Auction Theory. San Diego: Academic Press, 2nd edition.
Levati, M. V., and Neugebauer, T. (2004). An application of the English clock market
mechanism to public goods games. Experimental Economics, vol. 7(2), pp. 153 – 169.
List, J. A., and Lucking-Reiley, D. (2000). Demand reduction in multiunit auctions:
evidence from a sportscard field experiment. American Economic Review, 90(4), 961972.
McCabe, K. A., Rassenti, S. J., and Smith, V. L. (1990). Auction institutional design: Theory and
behavior of simultaneous multiple-unit generalizations of the Dutch and English auctions.
American Economic Review, vol. 80(5), pp. 1276-1283.
_____. (1992). Designing call auction institutions: Is double Dutch the best? The Economic
Journal, vol. 102(410), pp. 9-23.
_____. (1993). Designing a Uniform Price Double Auction; An Experimental Evaluation. In
Daniel Friedman and John Rust (Eds.), The Double Auction Market: Institutions,
Theories, and Evidence (307-332). Cambridge, MA: Perseus Publishing.
Milgrom, Paul, Lawrence Ausubel, Jon Levin and Ilya Segal. (2012). Incentive auction rules
option and discussion.
Pagano, Marco. (1989). Endogenous market thinness and stock price volatility. Review of
Economic Studies, 56(2), 269-287.
Porter, D., Rassenti, S., Shobe, W., Smith, V., and Winn, A. (2009). The design, testing and
implementation of Virginia’s NOx allowance auction. Journal of Economic Behavior
and Organization, vol. 69(2), 190 – 200.
Porter, D., and Vragov, R. (2006). An experimental examination of demand reduction in
multi-unit versions of the uniform-price, Vickrey, and English auctions.
Managerial and Decision Economics, 27(6), 445-458.
Smith, V. L. (1962). An experimental study of competitive market behavior. Journal of
Political Economy, 70(2), 111-137.
Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman (1991). Loss aversion in riskless choice: A referencedependent model. Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 106(4), pp. 1039-1061.

28

Figures and Tables
Figure 1. Experimental environment with values and costs (in cents) normalized such that the midpoint of
the competitive equilibrium tunnel is zero.
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Figure 2. Midpoint competitive equilibrium (CE) prices for periods 1 – 15.
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Figure 3. Average Under-Revelation a) Buyers – Hand-Run b) Buyers – Computerized c) Sellers – HandRun d) Sellers – Computerized

a) Buyers in the Hand-Run Experiments

b) Buyers in the Computerized Experiments
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c) Sellers in the Hand-Run Experiments

d) Sellers in the Computerized Experiments
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Figure 4. Evolution of Average Efficiency by Treatment

a) Hand-Run Sessions

b) Computerized Sessions
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Figure 5. Deviation from the Competitive Equilibrium Price

a) Hand-Run Sessions

b) Computerized Sessions
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Table 1. Profit for each buyer if he 1) buys all of his units at a price of M, 2) buys all of his units at a price of
M - 5 or 3) drops one unit of demand to achieve a price of M - 10. (Buyer B5 earns no profit at any of these
prices and is therefore excluded from the analysis.)

Buy all units at price M
Role

Buy all units at price M - 5

Drop one unit to achieve
price M - 10

Units
Bought

Profit
per
Unit

Total
Profit

Units
Bought

Profit
per
Unit

Total
Profit

Units
Bought

Profit
per
Unit

Total
Profit

B1

6

40

240

6

45

270

5

50

250

B2

3

30

90

3

35

105

2

40

80

B3

6

20

120

6

25

150

5

30

150

B4

3

10

30

3

15

45

2

20

40

35

Table 2. Treatment design

Treatment

Auction
Format

Clock
Direction

Sessions Participants
Total
Auctions
Total
per Session Participants
per
Auctions
Session
ED_Hand Hand-run Ascending
3
10
30
15
45
DE_Hand Hand-run Descending
3
10
30
15
45
ED_Comp Electronic Ascending
4
10
40
15
60
DE_Comp Electronic Descending
4
10
40
15
60
Total:

14

140

210

Table 3. Descriptive statistics of experimental results for the first five and last five in auctions each treatment

Under-Revelation as a
% of Traders’
Endowments
Treatment

Efficiency

Price Deviation

Buyer Profits

Seller Profits

from CE Midpoint

Relative to Nash

Relative to Nash

Equilibrium

Equilibrium

Auctions

Auctions

Auctions

Auctions

Auctions Auctions Auctions Auctions Auctions Auctions

1-5

11-15

1-5

11-15

1-5

11-15

1-5

11-15

1-5

11-15

ED_Hand

23.6%

17.8%

72.3%

80.5%

-7.7

-6.0

74.0%

77.3%

69.7%

85.4%

DE_Hand

32.2%

11.9%

65.7%

89.4%

1.0

-1.3

82.6%

116.1%

54.2%

71.1%

ED_Comp

42.6%

24.5%

50.9%

73.8%

-18.8

-2.2

80.7%

65.7%

7.4%

85.6%

DE_Comp

30.3%

24.9%

62.9%

76.4%

12.8

4.0

42.1%

84.7%

77.1%

70.6%

Table 4. Estimates from regression models of under-revelation

Hand-Run

Computerized

Regressor

Buyers

Sellers

Buyers

Sellers



0.072

0.087*

0.229**

0.430**

(0.052)

(0.036)

(0.063)

(0.053)

0.161*

0.036

0.311**

0.006

(0.073)

(0.051)

(0.084)

(0.081)

--

--

-0.002

-0.012*

(0.006)

(0.005)

*

-0.008

(0.008)

(0.008)

--

--

--

--

ED
t
ED * t
1/t

-0.516

-0.017

-**

**

0.554

(0.078)

(0.080)

-0.339**

-0.487**

(0.108)

(0.115)

356

325

450

445

R2

0.109

0.186

0.110

0.056

Wald 2

51.19

52.51

23.22

18.07

ED * 1/t
Observations

* Significant at 5% level
** Significant at 1% level

Table 5. Estimates from regression models of efficiency

Regressor

ED

Hand-Run

Computerized

0.455**

0.588**

(0.056)

(0.045)

0.181**

-0.151*

(0.069)

(0.064)

--

0.014**

t

(0.003)
ED * t

0.011*

--

(0.005)
Log(t)

0.427

**

--

(0.056)
ED * Log(t)

-0.258**

--

(0.079)
Observations

90

120

R2

0.531

0.333

Wald 2

68.57

67.61

* Significant at 5% level
** Significant at 1% level
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Table 6. Estimates from regression models of deviation from the competitive equilibrium price

Regressor

Hand-Run

Computerized



2.34

18.72**

(3.00)

(5.90)

-8.27†

-55.30**

(4.25)

(8.36)

-0.19

--

ED
t

(0.30)
ED * t

0.11

--

(0.42)
Log(t)

--

-12.61†
(6.75)

ED * Log(t)

--

44.95**
(9.66)

Observations

90

118

R2

0.162

0.381

Wald 2

8.41

60.09

† Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 1% level
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Appendix A. Under-revelation and trader profits
In Section 1 we showed that in the case of an ascending price auction no buyer
can profitably reduce demand to push the price from M - 5 to M - 10. In this appendix we
demonstrate that no coalition of buyers could profitably reduce demand in order to reduce the
price even further. We also show that no coalition of sellers could profitably reduce supply to
increase the price. Since the supply and demand curves are symmetrical, our proof for the
buyers (sellers) in the ED auctions holds for the sellers (buyers) in the DE auctions.
Given the supply curve, there are three prices less than M - 10 that buyers could achieve
through coordinated demand reduction. Reducing demand by nine units would achieve a price
of M - 20, reducing demand by 15 units would achieve a price of M - 30 and reducing demand by
18 units would achieve a price of M - 40. In Table A.1 we show the maximum number of units
by which each buyer could reduce his demand and increase his profit for each of these prices.
Notice that the buyers could not profitably reduce demand by enough units to achieve the lowest
prices of M - 30 or M - 40. Buyers would be willing to reduce demand by a total of only 11 and
13 units to achieve these prices, while reductions of 15 and 18 units would be necessary to
achieve them.
To achieve a price of M - 20 the buyers could profitably reduce demand by 9 units, which
is exactly the number needed for that price. However, the sellers could easily reduce supply to
make this demand reduction unprofitable. They would need to reduce supply by only one unit to
push the price back up to M - 10. Seller S3’s induced cost per unit is M - 20. Thus he would be
willing to reduce supply by one unit in order to achieve a price of M - 10 and earn a positive
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profit. Consequently, there is no coalition of buyers that could profitably reduce demand to
increase their profits.
Regarding the sellers we have shown in section 1 that the buyers would be willing to
reduce demand in order to prevent a price equal to M. We now consider whether the sellers
could profitably reduce supply to achieve a higher price.

In Table A.2 we show the maximum

number of units each seller would be willing to withhold in order to achieve a price of M + 10, M
+ 20, M + 30 or M + 40. Notice that, similar to the buyers, there is no coalition of sellers who
could profitably increase the price to M + 30 or M + 40. Those prices require supply reductions
of 15 and 18 units, while sellers would only be willing to withhold 14 and 15 units to achieve
them. The sellers would be willing to withhold a total of 13 units for a price of M + 20, while
only 9 units would need to be withheld. However, buyer B3 values six units at exactly M + 20,
and could therefore profitably withhold five of them to lower the price.
The final possibility is that the sellers withhold supply to push the price to the top of the
equilibrium price tunnel, M + 10. Sellers S1 through S4 could profitably withhold a total of six
units to achieve this price, while only three units of reduction would be necessary. However, the
buyers could then increase their profits by withholding a total of seven units of demand to push
the price back to M – 10. In Table A.3 we show that buyers B1 through B4 would all be willing
to withhold at least one unit of demand in order to prevent a price of M + 10, and the total
number of units by which demand could be profitably reduced is eight. Consequently, there is
no coalition of sellers that could profitably reduce supply to achieve a price higher than M - 5.
Any coalition that tried to do so could be thwarted by a coalition of buyers who could profitably
reduce demand to hold the price down.
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Table A.1. The maximum number of units by which each buyer would be willing to reduce demand to achieve a price lower than M - 5.
Reported profits (in cents) are the profits a buyer would receive if a lower price were achieved given the number of units by which he
reduced demand.

Price
M-5
Buyer

M - 20

M - 30

M - 40

Units
Bought

Profit

Units
Bought

Profit

Units
Bought

Profit

Units
Bought

Profit

B1

6

270

5

300

4

280

4

320

B2

3

105

3

105

2

120

2

140

B3

6

150

4

160

4

200

3

180

B4

3

45

2

60

2

80

1

50

B5

0

0

1

10

1

20

1

30

Total Reduction

9

11

13

Reduction Needed

9

15

18

Table A.2. The maximum number of units each seller would be willing to withhold to achieve a price greater than M - 5. Reported profits
(in cents) are the profits a seller would receive if a higher price were achieved given the number of units by which he reduced supply.

Price
M-5
Seller

M + 10

M + 20

M + 30

M + 40

Units Sold

Profit

Units Sold

Profit

Units Sold

Profit

Units Sold

Profit

Units Sold

Profit

S1

6

210

5

250

4

240

4

280

3

240

S2

3

75

2

80

2

100

2

120

2

140

S3

6

90

4

120

3

120

2

100

2

120

S4

3

15

1

20

1

30

1

40

1

50

S5

0

0

0

0

1

10

1

20

1

30

Supply Reduction

6

13

14

15

Reduction Needed

3

9

15

18
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Table A.3. The maximum number of units by which each buyer would be willing to reduce demand to achieve a price of M - 10 rather
than M + 10. Reported profits (in cents) are the profits a buyer would receive if a lower price were achieved given the number of units by
which he reduced demand.

Price
M + 10
Buyer

M - 10

Units
Bought

Profit

Units
Bought

Profit

B1

6

180

4

300

B2

3

60

2

105

B3

6

60

3

160

B4

3

0

1

60

B5

0

0

0

10

Total Reduction

8

Reduction Needed

7
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Participant Instructions

Note: The experiments in this paper were originally part of a larger research project which
compared one-sided and two-sided auctions. To keep the nomenclature more neutral across onesided and two-sided environments the protocols of those experiments called for sellers to be
referred to as “Type 1” participants and buyers as “Type 2” participants. The language in the
instructions uses these terms.
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Appendix B. Instructions for the hand-run auctions
I. English-Dutch Auctions
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making, and you will be paid for your
decisions in cash. Before we begin, you will be given an “accounting sheet” and provided with
an ID card that you will use for making decisions.

This experiment contains two types of participants “Type One” and “Type Two.” Your
accounting sheet indicates your type.

Type one: you have been given units (labeled unit 1, unit 2, unit 3 …) and a “transfer
cost” for transferring each unit to others. Type two: you do not have units, but you have been
given a “value” for receiving units from others. You are only able to transfer (receive) the units
shown on your accounting sheet. The values and costs on your sheets are private and will not be
revealed to other participants.

Your cash earnings:

Type one participants: for each unit you transfer, you will earn the “transfer price”
(which I’ll explain next) minus the “transfer cost” given on your accounting sheet. For example,
if the transfer price was $2 and your transfer cost was $1, you would earn $1 for each unit you
transferred.

Type two participants: for each unit you receive, you will earn the value on your
accounting sheet minus the transfer price. For example, if your value for each unit was $3 and
the transfer price was $2, you would earn $1 for each unit you received.

Experimental earnings will be multiplied by an exchange rate to determine your cash
earnings in dollars. For this experiment the exchange rate is 2.00 This means that your final
earnings from the experiment will be multiplied by 2 to determine your earnings in cash.

The transfer price:

The price for transferring units will be determined by a decision process in which both
types participate. The process is divided into several rounds.

1. To begin, I will announce an initial transfer price. At this price (which starts high) Type
Ones are automatically willing to transfer all of their assigned units. Type Ones are
unwilling to receive any units.
2. If at the starting price, Type Ones want to transfer more units than Type Twos are willing
to receive, I will announce a new lower price.
3. At each price announcement, either type may raise their ID card to either reduce by one
unit the amount they are willing to transfer (for Type Ones) or to increase by one unit the
amount they are willing to receive (for Type Twos).

4. When you raise your ID card to reduce (or add) a unit, I will call out your ID number to
recognize your reduction (addition) depending on your type. However, I will not publicly
announce your type. If multiple participants raise their cards at once, I will randomly
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select ID numbers. After recognizing an ID#, I will re-announce the price so that the
same ID or any other participant may be recognized for further reductions (additions) at
the same price.
5. This process will continue until the total number of units that Type Ones want to transfer
equals the number that Type Twos want to receive; it is only at this final transfer price,
that units are received and transferred.

6. For example, if at a price of $5, Type Ones want to transfer a total of 10 units and Type
Twos want to receive a total of 10 units, then the process will end. I will announce that
the final transfer price is $5.
Type one: You will earn the transfer price on each unit you transfer minus your transfer
cost (shown on your accounting sheet).
Type two: You will earn your private values for each unit you receive minus the transfer
price (applied to each unit).

7. We will repeat this process several times calling each repetition a “period.” Each period
will begin from scratch with new accounting sheets, costs and values assigned to each
participant. Your type will remain the same throughout the experiment.

*

*

*

Now we will begin a practice period to review your accounting sheet and the rules. The
practice session does not count toward your earnings.

No talking is permitted during the decision process. If you have a question, please raise
your hand and a monitor will come by for clarification.
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Accounting Sheet
Your type, units and values (costs) are
provided on your accounting sheets.

EXAMPLE
Accounting Sheet
Type One
subject #
Unit 1
Unit 2
Unit 3
Unit 4
Unit 5
Unit 6

Transfer price

Whenever a period ends, the monitor will
announce the transfer price. Write this transfer price
Transfer Cost
50
50
0
0
0
0

Transfer Cost
50

into the “transfer price” box. Next you will receive a
note confirming the number of units you received (or
transferred) as well as your earnings.

Earnings per
transfer

Type 1: you earn money for each unit
transferred.

Units for transfer
2

Units Received Units transferred

Earnings = (Price – Cost) * Units Transferred

Total Earnings

Type two: you earn money for each unit
PRACTICE
Accounting Sheet
Type Two
subject #
Unit 1
Unit 2
Unit 3
Unit 4
Unit 5
Unit 6

received.

Values
100
100
0
0
0
0
Value per unit
100

Units for
transfer
0

Earnings = (Value – Price) * Units Received

***
Transfer price

Earnings per
unit

Units Received
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Total Earnings

II. Dutch-English Auctions
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making, and you will be paid for your
decisions in cash. Before we begin, you will be given an “accounting sheet” and provided with
an ID card that you will use for making decisions.

This experiment contains two types of participants “Type One” and “Type Two.” Your
accounting sheet indicates your type.

Type one: you have been given units (labeled unit 1, unit 2, unit 3 …) and a “transfer
cost” for transferring each unit to others. Type two: you do not have units, but you have been
given a “value” for receiving units from others. You are only able to transfer (receive) the units
shown on your accounting sheet. The values and costs on your sheets are private and will not be
revealed to other participants.

Your cash earnings:

Type one participants: for each unit you transfer, you will earn the “transfer price”
(which I’ll explain next) minus the “transfer cost” given on your accounting sheet. For example,
if the transfer price was $2 and your transfer cost was $1, you would earn $1 for each unit you
transferred.
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Type two participants: for each unit you receive, you will earn the value on your
accounting sheet minus the transfer price. For example, if your value for each unit was $3 and
the transfer price was $2, you would earn $1 for each unit you received.

Experimental earnings will be multiplied by an exchange rate to determine your cash
earnings in dollars. For this experiment the exchange rate is 2.00 This means that your final
earnings from the experiment will be multiplied by 2 to determine your earnings in cash.

The transfer price:

The price for transferring units will be determined by a decision process in which both
types participate. The process is divided into several rounds.

8. To begin, I will announce an initial transfer price. At this price (which starts low) Type
Ones are unwilling to transfer any of their assigned units. Type Ones are willing to
receive all of their units.
9. If at the starting price, Type Ones want to receive more units than Type Twos are willing
to transfer, then I will announce a new higher price.
10. At each price announcement, either type may raise their ID card to either reduce by one
unit the amount they are willing to receive (for Type Twos) or to increase by one unit the
amount they are willing to transfer (for Type Ones).

11. When you raise your ID card to reduce (or add) a unit, I will call out your ID number to
recognize your reduction (addition) depending on your type. However, I will not publicly
announce your type. If multiple participants raise their cards at once, I will randomly
select ID numbers. After recognizing an ID#, I will re-announce the price so that the
same ID or any other participant may be recognized for further reductions (additions) at
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the same price.
12. This process will continue until the total number of units that Type Ones want to transfer
equals the number that Type Twos want to receive; it is only at this final transfer price,
that units are received and transferred.

13. For example, if at a price of $5, Type Ones want to transfer a total of 10 units and Type
Ones want to receive a total of 10 units, then the process will end. I will announce that
the final transfer price is $5.
Type one: You will earn the transfer price on any units you transfer minus your transfer
cost (shown on your accounting sheet).
Type two: You will earn your private values for each unit received minus the transfer
price (applied to each unit).

14. We will repeat this process several times calling each repetition a “period.” Each period
will begin from scratch with new accounting sheets, costs and values assigned to each
participant. Your type will remain the same throughout the experiment.

*

*

*

Now we will begin a practice period to review your accounting sheet and the rules. The
practice session does not count toward your earnings.

No talking is permitted during the decision process. If you have a question, please raise
your hand and a monitor will come by for clarification.
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Accounting Sheet
Your type, units and values (costs) are
provided on your accounting sheets.

EXAMPLE
Accounting Sheet
Type One
subject #
Unit 1
Unit 2
Unit 3
Unit 4
Unit 5
Unit 6

Transfer price

Whenever a period ends, the monitor will
announce the transfer price. Write this transfer price
Transfer Cost
50
50
0
0
0
0

Transfer Cost
50

into the “transfer price” box. Next you will receive a
note confirming the number of units you received (or
transferred) as well as your earnings.

Earnings per
transfer

Type 1: you earn money for each unit
transferred.

Units for transfer
2

Units Received Units transferred

Earnings = (Price – Cost) * Units Transferred

Total Earnings

Type two: you earn money for each unit
PRACTICE
Accounting Sheet
Type Two
subject #
Unit 1
Unit 2
Unit 3
Unit 4
Unit 5
Unit 6

received.

Values
100
100
0
0
0
0
Value per unit
100

Units for
transfer
0

Earnings = (Value – Price) * Units Received

***
Transfer price

Earnings per
unit

Units Received
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Total Earnings

Appendix C. Written instructions for the computerized auctions
I. English-Dutch Auctions
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making, and you will be paid for your
decisions in cash. If you read these instructions carefully and make appropriate decisions, you
may earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the
experiment.

[Slide 1]

All of your decisions will be entered through the software interface on your computer
screen. During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with any other participant.
If you have any questions, the experimenter(s) will be glad to answer them. If you do not follow
these instructions you will be excluded from the experiment and deprived of all payments aside
from the minimum payment of $7 for attending.

[Slide 2]

This experiment will last for several periods. There are two types of participants: “Type
1” and “Type 2.” Your participant type will be indicated at the top of your screen, and you will
remain that type for the entire experiment.
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Type 1 participants will be given units (labeled unit 1, unit 2, unit 3 …) and a “transfer
cost” for transferring each unit to others. Type 1’s are only able to transfer the units shown on
their computer screens. [Slide 3] In the example on your screen, the participant has been given
five units, so he could transfer any number of units between zero and five in this round.

[Questions?]

[Slide 4]

Type 2 participants do not have units, but have been given a “value” for receiving units
from others. Type 2’s are only able to receive the units shown on their computer screens. [Slide
5] In the example on your screen, the participant has values for up to four units, so he could
receive any number of units between zero and four in this round.

[Questions?]

During the experiment the values or transfer costs on your screen will be private and will
not be revealed to other participants.

Cash Earnings For Type 1 Participants
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[Slide 6]

For each unit she transfers, a Type 1 participant will earn the “transfer price” (which I’ll
explain shortly) minus the transfer cost given on her screen. In the example on your screen, the
current transfer price is $5.00 per unit and the transfer cost is $2.80 per unit. [Slide 7] This
means the participant would earn $2.20 for each unit she transferred. In the lower right of the
Type 1 participant’s screen is her “current profit.” A Type 1’s current profit is the amount of
money she would earn if she transferred all the units she is currently willing to transfer at the
current transfer price. In the example on your screen, the participant is not willing to transfer
any units, so her current profit is $0.00.

[Questions?]

Cash Earnings for Type 2 Participants

[Slide 8]

For each unit he receives, a Type 2 participant will earn the value on his screen minus the
transfer price. In the example on your screen, the current transfer price is $2.50 per unit and the
value is $4.35 per unit. [Slide 9] This means the participant would earn $1.85 for each unit he
received. The current profit is also displayed in the lower right of the Type 2 participant’s
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screen. A Type 2’s current profit is the amount of money he would earn if he received all of the
units he is currently willing to receive at the current transfer price. In the example on your
screen, the participant is currently willing to receive four units with a profit of $1.85 per unit.
Therefore, his current profit is 4 * $1.85 = $7.40.

[Questions?]

Experimental earnings will be multiplied by an exchange rate to determine your cash
earnings in dollars. For this experiment the exchange rate is 2. This means that your final
earnings from the experiment will be multiplied by 2 to determine your earnings in cash.

The transfer price:

The price for transferring units will be determined by a decision process in which both
types participate. The process is divided into several periods.

[Slide 10]

1. At the beginning of a period, your screen will display an initial transfer price. At this
price Type 2’s are automatically willing to receive all of the units for which they have
values. That is, they are willing to “demand” every unit on their screens. [Slide 11] The
units that a Type 2 is currently demanding are highlighted on his screen in blue, and the
total number of units he is demanding is indicated at the bottom of his screen under the
words “Personal Demand.” In the example on your screen, the period has just begun, so
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the participant has all four of his units highlighted blue, and his personal demand is
displayed as four.

[Questions?]

[Slide 12]

2. At the initial transfer price, Type 1’s are unwilling to transfer any units. That is, they are
not “supplying” any of the units on their screens. The units that a Type 1 is currently
supplying are highlighted on her screen in blue, and the total number of units she is
demanding is indicated at the bottom of her screen under the words “Personal Supply.”
In the example on your screen, the period has just begun, so the participant does not have
any of her units highlighted blue, and her personal supply is displayed as zero.

[Questions?]

[Slide 13]

3. The total number of units that all Type 2’s are willing to receive minus the total number
of units that all Type 1’s are willing to transfer is called the “excess demand.” All
participants can see the excess demand in the middle of their screens. If, at a given
transfer price, the excess demand is greater than zero (that is, Type 2’s want to receive
more units than Type 1’s are willing to receive), the transfer price will tick up by a predetermined amount. If excess demand is greater than 10, the transfer price will tick up by
$0.10 each second. If excess demand is 10 or lower, the transfer price will tick up by
$0.05 each second.

[Questions?]
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[Slide 14]

4. At a given transfer price, Type 1’s can increase the number of units they are willing to
transfer by clicking the button labeled “Increase Supply.” A Type 1’s personal supply
will increase by one unit each time she clicks the Increase Supply button. [Slide 15] In
the example on your screen, the Type 1 participant has clicked the Increase Supply button
once. Notice that one of her units is now highlighted blue, her personal supply has
increased to one unit and the excess demand has decreased from 24 units to 23 units.

[Questions?]

[Slide 16]

5. At a given transfer price, Type 2’s can decrease the number of units they are willing to
receive by clicking the button labeled “Decrease Demand.” A Type 2’s personal demand
will decrease by one unit each time he clicks the Decrease Demand button. [Slide 17] In
the example on your screen, the Type 2 participant has clicked the Decrease Demand
button once. Notice that one of his units is no longer highlighted blue, his personal
demand has decreased to three units, and the excess demand has decreased from 23 units
to 22 units.

[Questions?]

6. Both Type 1’s and Type 2’s can click their respective buttons multiple times at the same
price. Each time a player clicks the Increase Supply or Decrease Demand button, the
transfer price will pause for an additional second before ticking up.

[Questions?]
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7. Notice that whenever a participant of either type clicks his button, the excess demand
decreases by one unit. [Slide 18] When the excess demand reaches 10 units, the coloring
around the Excess Demand display will change from green to yellow. At this point the
transfer price will tick up at a rate of $0.05 cents per second. [Slide 19] When the excess
demand reaches zero, the coloring will change from yellow to red. Once this has
happened it means that the total number of units that Type 1’s want to transfer equals the
number that Type 2’s want to receive.

8. The price at which excess supply reaches zero is the final transfer price for the period. It
is only at this final transfer price that all units are received and transferred.

Type 1’s will earn the final transfer price on each unit they transfer minus the
transfer cost per unit transferred.

Type 2’s will earn their private value for each unit they receive minus the final transfer
price.

[Questions?]

[Slide 20]

9. We will repeat this process several times, calling each repetition a “period.” Each period
will begin from scratch with new transfer costs and values assigned to each participant.
However, your participant type will remain the same throughout the experiment. At the
end of each period, a green button labeled “Continue” will appear on your screen. Once
all participants have clicked the Continue button, the next period will begin.

[Questions?]
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[Slide 21]

10. You will have an experiment history on the right of your screen, which will be updated at
the end of each period. The history records, for each period, the final transfer price, the
number of units you transferred or received, the profit you earned for the period, and the
sum of all your profits up to that period in the experiment. In the example on your
screen, the entry for Period 0 shows a profit for the period of $1.65, but a cumulative
profit of $0.00. That is because Period 0 is a practice period. You will not be paid for
your decisions in Period 0, but the experience you gain may be helpful to you in the
remaining periods. You will be paid for your decisions in all periods after Period 0.

[Questions?]
II. Dutch-English Auctions
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making, and you will be paid for your
decisions in cash. If you read these instructions carefully and make appropriate decisions, you
may earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the
experiment.

[Slide 1]

All of your decisions will be entered through the software interface on your computer
screen. During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with any other participant.
If you have any questions, the experimenter(s) will be glad to answer them. If you do not follow
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these instructions you will be excluded from the experiment and deprived of all payments aside
from the minimum payment of $7 for attending.

[Slide 2]

This experiment will last for several periods. There are two types of participants: “Type
1” and “Type 2.” Your participant type will be indicated at the top of your screen, and you will
remain that type for the entire experiment.

Type 1 participants will be given units (labeled unit 1, unit 2, unit 3 …) and a “transfer
cost” for transferring each unit to others. Type 1’s are only able to transfer the units shown on
their computer screens. [Slide 3] In the example on your screen, the participant has been given
five units, so he could transfer any number of units between zero and five in this round.

[Questions?]

[Slide 4]

Type 2 participants do not have units, but have been given a “value” for receiving units
from others. Type 2’s are only able to receive the units shown on their computer screens. [Slide
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5] In the example on your screen, the participant has values for up to four units, so he could
receive any number of units between zero and four in this round.

[Questions?]

During the experiment the values or transfer costs on your screen will be private and will
not be revealed to other participants.

Cash Earnings For Type 1 Participants

[Slide 6]

For each unit she transfers, a Type 1 participant will earn the “transfer price” (which I’ll
explain shortly) minus the transfer cost given on her screen. In the example on your screen, the
current transfer price is $5.00 per unit and the transfer cost is $2.80 per unit. [Slide 7] This
means the participant would earn $2.20 for each unit she transferred. In the lower right of the
Type 1 participant’s screen is her “current profit.” A Type 1’s current profit is the amount of
money she would earn if she transferred all the units she is currently willing to transfer at the
current transfer price. In the example on your screen, the participant is currently willing to
transfer five units with a profit of $2.20 per unit. Therefore, her current profit is 5 * $2.20 =
$11.00.
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[Questions?]

Cash Earnings for Type 2 Participants

[Slide 8]

For each unit he receives, a Type 2 participant will earn the value on his screen minus the
transfer price. In the example on your screen, the current transfer price is $2.50 per unit and the
value is $4.35 per unit. [Slide 9] This means the participant would earn $1.85 for each unit he
received. The current profit is also displayed in the lower right of the Type 2 participant’s
screen. A Type 2’s current profit is the amount of money he would earn if he received all of the
units he is currently willing to receive at the current transfer price. In the example on your
screen, the participant is not willing to receive any units, so his current profit is $0.00.

[Questions?]

Experimental earnings will be multiplied by an exchange rate to determine your cash
earnings in dollars. For this experiment the exchange rate is 2. This means that your final
earnings from the experiment will be multiplied by 2 to determine your earnings in cash.
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The transfer price:

The price for transferring units will be determined by a decision process in which both
types participate. The process is divided into several periods.

[Slide 10]

1. At the beginning of a period, your screen will display an initial transfer price. At this
price Type 1’s are automatically willing to transfer all of their assigned units. That is,
they are willing to “supply” every unit on their screens. [Slide 11] The units that a Type 1
is currently supplying are highlighted on her screen in blue, and the total number of units
she is supplying is indicated at the bottom of her screen under the words “Personal
Supply.” In the example on your screen, the period has just begun, so the participant has
all five of her units highlighted blue, and her personal supply is displayed as five.

[Questions?]

[Slide 12]

2. At the initial transfer price, Type 2’s are unwilling to receive any units. That is, they are
not “demanding” any of the units on their screens. The units that a Type 2 is currently
demanding are highlighted on his screen in blue, and the total number of units he is
demanding is indicated at the bottom of his screen under the words “Personal Demand.”
In the example on your screen, the period has just begun, so the participant does not have
any of his units highlighted blue, and his personal demand is displayed as zero.

[Questions?]
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[Slide 13]

3. The total number of units that all Type 1’s are willing to transfer minus the total number
of units that all Type 2’s are willing to receive is called the “excess supply.” All
participants can see the excess supply in the middle of their screens. If, at a given
transfer price, the excess supply is greater than zero (that is, Type 1’s want to transfer
more units than Type 2’s are willing to receive), the transfer price will tick down by a
pre-determined amount. If excess supply is greater than 10, the transfer price will tick
down by $0.10 each second. If excess supply is 10 or lower, the transfer price will tick
down by $0.05 each second.

[Questions?]

[Slide 14]

4. At a given transfer price, Type 1’s can decrease the number of units they are willing to
transfer by clicking the button labeled “Decrease Supply.” A Type 1’s personal supply
will decrease by one unit each time she clicks the Decrease Supply button. [Slide 15] In
the example on your screen, the Type 1 participant has clicked the Decrease Supply
button once. Notice that one of her units is no longer highlighted blue, her personal
supply has decreased to four units and the excess supply has decreased from 24 units to
23 units.

[Questions?]

[Slide 16]
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5. At a given transfer price, Type 2’s can increase the number of units they are willing to
receive by clicking the button labeled “Increase Demand.” A Type 2’s personal demand
will increase by one unit each time he clicks the Increase Demand button. [Slide 17] In
the example on your screen, the Type 2 participant has clicked the Increase Demand
button once. Notice that one of his units is now highlighted blue, his personal demand
has increased to one unit, and the excess supply has decreased from 23 units to 22 units.

[Questions?]

6. Both Type 1’s and Type 2’s can click their respective buttons multiple times at the same
price. Each time a player clicks the Decrease Supply or Increase Demand button, the
transfer price will pause for an additional second before ticking down.

[Questions?]

7. Notice that whenever a participant of either type clicks his button, the excess supply
decreases by one unit. [Slide 18] When the excess supply reaches 10 units, the coloring
around the Excess Supply display will change from green to yellow. At this point the
transfer price will tick down at a rate of $0.05 cents per second. [Slide 19] When the
excess supply reaches zero, the coloring will change from yellow to red. Once this has
happened it means that the total number of units that Type 1’s want to transfer equals the
number that Type 2’s want to receive.

8. The price at which excess supply reaches zero is the final transfer price for the period. It
is only at this final transfer price that all units are received and transferred.

Type 1’s will earn the final transfer price on each unit they transfer minus the
transfer cost per unit transferred.

Type 2’s will earn their private value for each unit they receive minus the final transfer
price.
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[Questions?]

[Slide 20]

9. We will repeat this process several times, calling each repetition a “period.” Each period
will begin from scratch with new transfer costs and values assigned to each participant.
However, your participant type will remain the same throughout the experiment. At the
end of each period, a green button labeled “Continue” will appear on your screen. Once
all participants have clicked the Continue button, the next period will begin.

[Questions?]

[Slide 21]

10. You will have an experiment history on the right of your screen, which will be updated at
the end of each period. The history records, for each period, the final transfer price, the
number of units you transferred or received, the profit you earned for the period, and the
sum of all your profits up to that period in the experiment. In the example on your
screen, the entry for Period 0 shows a profit for the period of $0.75, but a cumulative
profit of $0.00. That is because Period 0 is a practice period. You will not be paid for
your decisions in Period 0, but the experience you gain may be helpful to you in the
remaining periods. You will be paid for your decisions in all periods after Period 0.

[Questions?]
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Appendix D. Instruction slides for computerized experiments
I. English-Dutch Auctions
Slide 1

Slide 2

Slide 3

Slide 4
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Slide 5

Slide 6
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Slide 7

Slide 8
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Slide 9

Slide 10
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Slide 11

Slide 12
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Slide 13

Slide 14

77

Slilde 15

Slide 16
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Slide 17

Slide 18
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Slide 19

Slide 20
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Slide 21
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II. Dutch-English Auctions
Slide 1

Slide 2
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Slide 3

Slide 4
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Slide 5

Slide 6
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Slide 7

Slide 8
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Slide 9

Slide 10
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Slide 11

Slide 12
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Slide 13

Slide 14
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Slilde 15

Slide 16
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Slide 17

Slide 18
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Slide 19

Slide 20
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Slide 21
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